

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 058173  
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DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:DANDERSON:EM  
APPROVED BY D - MR. CHRISTOPHER  
EUR -AAHARTMAN  
S/S:AWOTTO  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 058173

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (GENSCHER, HANS-DIETRICH), GW, GE, UR

SUBJECT:GENSCHER VISIT TO WASHINGTON, MARCH 13-14, 1977

SUMMARY: FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHEER VISITED WASHINGTON  
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TO WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 058173

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FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION BONN INFO BRASILIA, MOSCOW,  
NATO, BERLIN, USBERLIN FROM STATE MARCH 16:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 058173

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S/S: PSEBASTIAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 058173

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 058173 SENT ACTION TO WHITE HOUSE

16 MAR 77

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 058173

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FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION BONN INFO BRASILIA, MOSCOW,  
NATO, BERLIN, USBERLIN FROM STATE MARCH 16:

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HOUSE FOLLOWING GENSCHER'S CALL ON THE PRESIDENT, (TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL). THEY ALSO AGREED ON GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING PRESS QUERIES ON THE NUCLEAR EXPORT ISSUE (TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL).

5. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: THE SECRETARY PROVIDED A RUNDOWN OF WHERE WE STOOD PRIOR TO HIS UPCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW. HE FELT THAT, DESPITE OUR PRESSURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SOVIETS STILL WISHED TO PROCEED WITH SERIOUS SALT DISCUSSIONS. HE EXPECTED ALSO TO DISCUSS TRADE, HUMAN RIGHTS, MBFR AND THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE GROMYKO HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE SOVIETS WISHED TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR POSITION ON SALT WAS NOT YET FIXED BUT WOULD BE SOON SO THAT HE COULD STOP IN BRUSSELS TO BRIEF THE NAC PRIOR TO MOSCOW.

6. MBFR: GENSCHER STRESSED, AND THE SECRETARY AGREED, THAT THE WESTERN OBJECTIVES OF PARITY AND COLLECTIVITY REMAINED THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WOULD FORM THE BASIS OF HIS APPROACH IN MOSCOW. GENSCHER SAID HE STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY SYMBOLIC FIRST-STEP REDUCTIONS, WHICH HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROPOSE. THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH HIM. GENSCHER SAID HE THOUGHT THE WEST SHOULD FIRST SETTLE SALT II AND THEN MOVE ON TO MBFR. HE WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF REDUCING TROOPS BY UNITS OR INCLUDING EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. FURTHER, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE WEST TO FEEL UNDER TIME PRESSURE IN VIENNA.

7. CSCE: THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE AIMING AT BELGRADE FOR A REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THREE BASKETS. GENSCHER AGREED, COMMENTING THAT THE WEST SHOULD STEER BETWEEN MAKING UP A BALANCE SHEET OF WHAT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED AND WHAT CAN BE FORE-  
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SEEN FOR THE FUTURE. HE AGREED WITH HARTMAN THAT IF WE HAD TO CONSIDER BREZHNEV'S PROPOSALS FOR SPECIFIC CONFERENCES, THEN WE MIGHT CONSIDER AN ENVIRONMENTAL ONE AS A FALLBACK. GENSCHER WARNED THAT THE FRG'S FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE IN WEST BERLIN COULD COMPLICATE THINGS FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE, BUT THAT THE BONN GOVERNMENT WAS ADAMANT THAT BERLIN SHOULD

BENEFIT FROM CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. GENSCHER SAID THAT ONE IDEA WHICH BONN WAS CONSIDERING FOR BELGRADE WAS THE INCLUSION OF A NORTH-SOUTH ISSUE ON THE AGENDA. HE SAID THE GERMANS WOULD LET US KNOW THEIR VIEWS ON THIS POSSIBILITY ONCE THEIR THINKING HAD GONE FURTHER.

8. AS TO PROCEDURES FOR THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP, GENSCHER SAID HE WAS FLEXIBLE ON THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION: HE FAVORED A THREE-STAGE CONFERENCE OF A PUBLIC OPENING, MEETINGS OF COMMISSIONS AND A PUBLIC CLOSING. HE ALSO SAID THERE SHOULD BE ANOTHER REVIEW CONFERENCE IN THE FUTURE. SECRETARY VANCE AGREED WITH GENSCHER'S THOUGHTS ON THESE PROCEDURES.

9. BERLIN: GENSCHER EXPRESSED STRONG APPRECIATION FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S RECENT BERLIN VISIT, WHICH CAME AT A TIME WHEN BERLINERS BADLY NEEDED A BOOST. THE SOVIETS AND THE GDR WERE TAKING A STIFF AND RESTRICTIVE ATTITUDE ON THE BERLIN AGREEMENT AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO UNDERMINE THE FOUR POWER STATUS OF THE CITY. HE SAID THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF THE SECRETARY WOULD RAISE THE BERLIN ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD DO SO, NOTING THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAD ALREADY RAISED IT IN FIRM TERMS WITH DOBRYNIN.

10. FRG-USSR RELATIONS: VAN WELL GAVE A RUN-DOWN OF THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS. HIS ACCOUNT WAS DOWN-SECRET

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BEAT AND DESCRIBED IN PARTICULAR THE DIFFICULTIES THE FRG WAS EXPERIENCING IN THE FOREIGN REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN. HE WOULD BE VISITING MOSCOW FROM MARCH 22 TO 24 TO TRY TO FIND OUT WHETHER THERE WERE ANY PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS AND TO TRY TO DIVINE THE SOURCE OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. HE SAID HE WOULD BRIEF THE THREE WESTERN AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 24 SO

THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD HAVE A REPORT OF THESE TALKS  
BEFORE HIS OWN ARRIVAL ON MARCH 26.

11. COMMENT: THE TONE OF THE MEETINGS WAS UNIFORMLY  
FRIENDLY. GENSCHER WAS CLEARLY IMPRESSED BY THE LEVEL  
AND EXTENT OF ATTENTION PAID TO HIM. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY  
CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESS INTERPRETATION OF HIS VISIT,  
I.E. THAT IT MARKED AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE A DETERIORATING  
RELATIONSHIP. HIS OWN BACKGROUNDING OF THE GERMAN  
PRESS IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE WAS  
DELIBERATELY OPTIMISTIC. WE TOO WILL BE TAKING A

POSITIVE LINE WITH THE PRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED  
OBSERVERS HERE. WHILE THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A MAJOR PROBLEM  
OVER THE BRAZILIAN AFFAIR, THIS IS NOT THE BE-ALL AND  
END-ALL OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. AS  
GENSCHER CORRECTLY POINTED OUT, THE CORE OF OUR RELATION-  
SHIP IS THE CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BUILT UP  
OVER SEVERAL DECADES. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

UNQUOTE VANCE

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